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The Bleeding Edge: Theranos and the 
Growing Risk of an Unregulated Private 
Securities Market 
Theodore O’Brien* 
America’s securities laws and regulations, most of which were 
created in the early twentieth century, are increasingly irrelevant 
to the most dynamic emerging companies.  Today, companies with 
sufficient investor interest can raise ample capital through private 
and exempt offerings, all while eschewing the public exchanges 
and the associated burdens of the initial public offering, public 
disclosures, and regulatory scrutiny.  Airbnb, Inc., for example, 
quickly tapped private investors for $1 billion in April of 2020,1 
adding to the estimated $4.4 billion the company had previously 
raised.2  The fundamental shift from public to private companies 
is evidenced by the so-called “unicorns,” the more than 400 
private companies valued at more than $1 billion. unicorns like 
Uber, Airbnb, SpaceX, and WeWork have raised billions of 
dollars without the need to tap retail investors through the public 
exchanges. The unicorn phenomenon is emblematic of the shift 
away from public markets, with more and more companies 
choosing to stay private and raise capital through private 
placements. Despite a fast-evolving capital market, America’s 
 
 * Executive Editor, Volume 28 of the University of Miami Business Law Review; Juris 
Doctor Candidate, University of Miami School of Law, 2020; Bachelor of Arts, Political 
Science, University of Oregon, 2011. I thank Professor Teresa Verges, a tireless advocate 
for investors, who provided thoughtful feedback and consistent support throughout this 
process.  I also thank the entire Executive Board of the University of Miami Business Law 
Review for their dedication to this publication.   
1 Airbnb, Silver Lake, Sixth Street Partners Invest $1 Billion in Airbnb, (Apr. 6, 
2020, 4:24 p.m.) https://news.airbnb.com/silver-lake-sixth-street-partners-invest-
1-billion-in-airbnb/. 
2 Deirdre Bosa and Lauren Feiner, CNBC, Airbnb is Listening to Investment 
Pitches Despite a Large Cash Pile and Down Market, (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/19/airbnb-is-listening-to-investment-pitches-
despite-large-cash.html. 
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securities regulations are still largely based on the 1930s-era 
laws passed in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Scholars 
and regulators have voiced concerns about the lack of regulation 
in the private markets and the potential harms posed by large, 
unregulated private companies. 
At its peak, blood-testing company Theranos was a unicorn, 
valued at $9 billion. The valuation reflected intense investor 
enthusiasm for a company with significant potential to shake up 
the biotechnology and healthcare industries. Far from realizing 
its financial and business goals, Theranos perpetrated a fraud on 
investors, customers, and business partners. Executives misled 
current and prospective investors with inflated financial 
projections. The company’s founder and employees deceived 
business partners with falsified product tests. The company 
continued to tout its “revolutionary” blood testing technology, 
but, behind the scenes, employees consistently failed to achieve 
the necessary technological breakthroughs. Rather than admit the 
setbacks, Theranos deviated from established medical and 
scientific methods by altering tests and, when that did not work, 
Theranos ran the tests on its rivals’ status quo blood testing 
machines. Eventually, intrepid reporters, regulators, and 
prosecutors uncovered the fraud, culminating in a series of 
lawsuits brought by investors, business partners, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  
In the aftermath, many commentators wondered how a critically 
flawed company could raise so much money from prominent 
investors at such a high valuation. Theranos was able to 
perpetrate its fraud, in part, because it operated as a private 
company and therefore did not have to submit to the same onerous 
disclosures that public companies must provide to the SEC and 
the investing public. A public company, unlike Theranos, must 
register with state and federal regulators, submit periodic filings, 
and, importantly, certify its financials under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Theranos was able to raise $700 million without providing those 
disclosures to its investors—disclosures that were designed to 
protect and inform investors. The Theranos story provides a lens 
through which we see the tension between private capital 
formation and protection of investors.  
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In this Note, I closely examine the Theranos collapse and the 
litigation that continues in its aftermath. This Note will argue that 
Theranos should be viewed as an example of regulatory failure. 
Current securities regulations allow private companies to operate 
in the shadows, even while these companies raise large sums from 
sophisticated and (increasingly) unsophisticated investors alike 
with little oversight and minimal transparency. This Note 
examines Theranos as a cautionary tale exemplifying the risks of 
failing to regulate private companies despite the dramatic decline 
in IPOs and the corresponding expansion of private companies, 
particularly unicorns.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Retail investors learned a hard lesson when the dot-com bubble burst 
in the early 2000s: it is common—even likely—to lose money investing 
in startups. Experienced venture capital investors, of course, already knew 
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that lesson well. But for many average investors, the hot initial public 
offerings (“IPOs”) of the 1990s were their first foray into speculating on 
technology companies and internet startups.  
Today, venture capital investors accept the probability that most of 
their investments will fail to materialize because they hope that a few 
winners will become massively valuable companies.3 Indeed, academic 
research suggests that most start-ups fail to achieve the projected return on 
investment and 30 to 40 percent result in a complete loss for the investor.4 
The high risks associated with start-up investments explain why legislators 
and regulators have long sought to prevent unsophisticated retail investors 
from investing in start-ups. For the most part, speculative early-stage 
investments are reserved for venture capitalists, institutional investors, and 
other accredited investors—at least until a start-up matures enough to 
successfully navigate the IPO process. To tap the public markets, then, 
companies must undergo the expensive and demanding initial public 
offering process, disclosing the company’s financial information, risks, 
and other important information.  
The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)5 imposes certain 
disclosure requirements on companies seeking a public offering “to 
promote full and fair disclosure necessary for the investor to make an 
informed investment decision.”6 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed 
the Securities Act into law as part of his administration’s response to the 
stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. In the Roaring 
Twenties, the American public enthusiastically bought into the soaring 
economy, with more Americans investing in the stock market than ever 
 
3 A common refrain in venture capital is that “Nine out of 10 startups fail.” 
Although that statistic appears largely anecdotal and does not reflect the true 
startup failure rate, similarly high failure rates are often cited by venture 
capitalists to show the high risk associated with investing in startups. Erin 
Griffith, Conventional Wisdom Says 90% of Startups Fail. Data Says Otherwise. 
FORTUNE (June 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/27/startup-advice-data-
failure/. 
4 Research by Harvard Business School’s Shikhar Ghosh estimates that between 
70 to 80 percent of start-ups fail to meet the projected return on investment and 
30 to 40 percent of start-ups end in a complete loss for the investor. See, Carmen 
Nobel, Why Companies Fail—and How Their Founders Can Bounce Back, 
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 11, 2019, 6:29 PM), 
https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-companies-failand-how-their-founders-can-
bounce-back.  
5 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018). 
6 See JIM BARTOS, UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 7 
(2006). 
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before—a development that made the crash all the more devastating.7 In 
an effort to reassure the investing public, Roosevelt signed a series of bills 
into law that reworked the securities markets.8  This marked a sea change 
that transformed American securities law “from a system of caveat emptor 
to one of caveat vendor,” requiring companies to make substantial 
disclosures before offering stock.9  
The Securities Act imposes these disclosure requirements on all 
securities and bars all transactions in unregistered securities, unless there 
is an exemption.10 Per the SEC’s website, the Securities Act accomplishes 
two primary goals: (1) make available to investors financial and other 
information related to the securities being offered, and (2) “prohibit deceit, 
misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.”11  To go 
public, a company must complete a complicated, expensive, and time-
consuming IPO process.12  If successful, the issuer must continue to 
comply with reporting and disclosure requirements or face reprisal from 
shareholders or the SEC.13  
The Securities Act carves out three primary exemptions from the 
Securities Act’s registration provisions: § 3 excludes certain categories of 
securities from registration; § 4 exempts various transactions from 
registration; and § 28 grants the SEC the power to make rules that expand 
the statutory exemptions.14 Federal securities laws and regulations 
effectively set a dividing line between “public” securities (those securities 
that are offered to the public and traded on exchanges like the New York 
 
7 ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL 7 (2000). 
8 See EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM 
TO MADOFF 250-52 (2017) (describing the context of the New Deal-era 
securities reforms). 
9 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (3d ed. 2011). 
10 15 U.S. Code § 77e (2018); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 104 (2016). 
11 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html#secact1933. 
12 See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, CONSIDERING AN IPO TO 
FUEL YOUR COMPANY’S FUTURE? INSIGHT INTO THE COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC AND 
BEING PUBLIC 3-20 (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf.  
13 See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 48 Stat. 
881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.) (“Exchange Act”) 
(providing the statutory basis for SEC rules requiring public companies to file 
current, quarterly, and annual reports).  
14 Id. 
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Stock Exchange) and “private” securities (those securities and transactions 
that are exempt from registration).  
As will be discussed in Part II, going public requires a company to 
fulfill the Securities Act registration requirements and submit periodic 
reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).15 In 
contrast, private companies and those securities otherwise exempted from 
SEC registration do not need to fulfill either requirement, allowing these 
companies to avoid the costly and sometimes invasive public disclosure 
system. Companies were historically willing to endure the expense and 
lack of privacy because going public offered a significant advantage, 
namely accessing the public markets. Over time, the calculus has changed; 
private placements now account for more capital raised in the United 
States than publicly registered stock offerings.16  Today, even some of the 
largest and most dynamic companies choose to stay private as long as 
possible.17  
There are many possible explanations for why companies elect to 
delay a public offering,18 but, whatever the cause, the maturation of the 
private securities market has made the decision to stay private easier and 
more efficient than ever before. Private securities sales often involve 
several problems: “high transaction costs and information costs, including 
difficulties matching buyers and sellers, a lack of information requiring 
extensive due diligence, and the costs of negotiating and papering 
transactions.”19 In the 2000s, electronic marketplaces began facilitating 
purchases and sales of shares in private companies, including then-popular 
start-ups like Facebook and LinkedIn.20  These electronic marketplaces 
 
15 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2018). 
16 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the 
Decline of the Public Company, 68 Hastings L.J. 445, 472 (2017) (“Publicly 
registered stock offerings now represent only a minor share of the capital raised 
in the United States. The vast majority of U.S. corporate capital is raised instead 
as debt or as privately placed equity. In particular, private placements of 
corporate capital (both equity and debt) have rapidly overtaken public offerings, 
and the gap is only increasing.”) 
17 See infra Part II; see also Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. 
Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity 
Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 717 (2018) (“As the private market has grown, 
the public offering market has shrunk. In turn, there has been a marked drop-off 
in initial public offerings (IPOs).”). 
18 See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 17, at 717. 
19 Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37 
(2012). 
20 Douglas MacMillan and Ari Levy, LinkedIn Said to Be Worth Almost $3 
Billion in Secondary Sale, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2011), 
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improved efficiency in private transactions by connecting buyers and 
sellers through a central location, publishing buy-sell bid pricing, 
disseminating third-party research reports, and providing standardized 
contracts.21 Investment funds, institutional investors, venture capitalists, 
wealthy individuals, and even mutual funds can now efficiently buy up 
shares of private companies.22 The increasingly liquid market for private 
securities, in turn, relieved pressure on companies to go public because 
shareholders—typically early investors, employees, and management—
could sell their shares at attractive prices quickly, legally, and without 
much effort. The growth of the private securities market coincides with 
the “‘retailization’ of private investment funds, whereby retail investors 
are increasingly able to participate in private side investments either 
directly or through mutual funds.”23  
Many scholars have warned that this evolution poses serious risks to 
the public.24  But, for all the many private companies that have 
disappointed investors, there are few examples where the harm extended 
beyond venture capitalists and employees. Perhaps the lack of serious, far-
reaching harm explains why there has been little to no regulatory or 
legislative attention paid to this issue. After all, until recently, there were 
no massive frauds or collapses involving unicorns that would have raised 
public or governmental concern. Then, Theranos collapsed. The blood 
testing company evolved from classic Silicon Valley start-up to a media-
charming, seemingly revolutionary company with a multi-billion-dollar 
valuation, before finally imploding amid myriad lawsuits, questions about 
its technology, and federal prosecutors accusing the company and its 
executives of fraud.  Venture capitalists were not the only victims of the 
fraud: corporate partners lost significant millions of dollars when the 




21 Ibrahim, supra note 20, at 38. 
22 See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 17, at 724 (“[T]he private market is 
inhabited not only by wealthy individuals . . . but by a menagerie of vehicles 
such as venture capital funds, private equity, corporate venture capital, hedge 
funds, sovereign wealth funds, mutual fund complexes, and family offices. 
Multiple types of private investors make it possible to have ‘[e]arly stage 
VCs selling to Growth Equity Investors selling to Mutual Funds and Sovereign 
Wealth Funds.’) (quoting Amie Hutchinson, Why Are More Companies Staying 
Private?, GOODWIN (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/hutchinson-goodwin-presentation-
acsec-021517.pdf.). 
23 de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 468. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
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funds in which they invested owned Theranos shares; and Theranos’ faulty 
testing delivered inaccurate results to the unsuspecting public.25 
Before it was exposed as a fraud, Theranos raised $700 million from 
private investors at ever-climbing valuations peaking at $9 billion.26 The 
company offered its unreliable blood-testing to customers, leading to 
confusion and fear by misdiagnosed patients. Theranos also misled 
investors—from billionaire investors like Rupert Murdoch to hedge funds 
and other institutional investors—with inaccurate projections and false 
statements. The company did this by raising funds through several private 
fundraising rounds over about a decade.27 Importantly, Theranos never 
attempted to register as a public company, allowing the company to avoid 
the type of financial and business disclosures that public companies 
provide investors and the SEC. This Note argues that had Theranos 
attempted to or completed an initial public offering, its many flaws would 
have been exposed, quickening its demise and protecting the public.  
Theranos is a dramatic example of the societal and market risks posed 
by today’s unicorns. More broadly, Theranos is a useful case study 
exposing vulnerabilities in modern securities regulations and, perhaps, 
suggesting necessary reforms. This paper uses Theranos as a vehicle for 
understanding: first, the current regulatory framework and how private 
companies raise funds outside the public markets (Part II); second, the 
scale of unicorns and problems posed by these companies (Part III); and 
finally, third, whether proposed regulatory reforms would have prevented 
(or at least detected) the Theranos fraud (Part IV). The solutions offered 
to regulate the private securities market include increasing disclosure 
requirements, requiring corporate executives to certify those disclosures, 
and increasing transparency around private securities transactions.  
 
25 See infra Part III, B. 
26 Complaint at 11, SEC v. Holmes & Theranos Inc., No. 5:18-CV-01602, 2018 
WL 1321981 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2018) (“From late 2013 to 2015, Holmes, 
Balwani, and Theranos raised over $700 million from investors in two financing 
rounds.”). 
27 See White Decl. ¶ 6. (White, Theranos’ then-Corporate Counsel, explaining 
“Theranos has instead raised money through private sales of stock to 
sophisticated investors through several rounds of venture financing in five 
different series of preferred stock: Series A Preferred stock; Series B Preferred 
stock; Series C Preferred stock; Series C-1 Preferred stock; and Series C-2 
Preferred stock. Different series of preferred stock have different liquidation 
preferences. Series C, C-1, and C-2 Preferred are senior in preference to Series 
A and B Preferred.”). 
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II. MODERN SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE 
GROWTH OF THE SECONDARY MARKET 
A. The Opportunity and Costs of Going Public 
 
If sunlight is the best disinfectant, then the initial public offering is the 
market’s sunlight, forcing companies to shed light on their businesses, 
finances, and risks.28 Congress designed this disclosure and registration 
process back in the aftermath of the Stock Market Crash of 1929. 
Following the crash, Congress publicly investigated Wall Street, most 
famously the Pecora Commission hearings. The hearings shined a bright 
light on deception and abuses on Wall Street, including material 
misrepresentations by companies, unethical (if not illegal then) deception 
by brokers, and outright false statements about companies’ assets and 
financial health.29 Partly in response to the ugly practices uncovered by 
congressional investigations, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 
to achieve “truth in securities,” which represented “a narrowly focused but 
high-powered effort to assure full and fair disclosure on the special 
occasion of a public offering.”30  
While today fewer companies are choosing to go public, for the better 
part of the last century, going public represented a significant (and 
desirable) step in a company’s evolution. Public financing allows a 
company to expand, increase its working capital, retire preexisting debt, 
and give early investors and employees an opportunity to selling their 
shares on the public market.31 Going public is also thought to increase a 
company’s public profile and give it “an air of financial success,” helping 
the company raise future funds, attract new employees, and gain a stronger 
market position.32 The bargain, per federal securities legislation, is that in 
exchange for access to the public markets, companies must disclose 
material information necessary for investors to make an informed 
decision.  
 
28 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914). 
29 For a thorough review of the Pecora Commission’s work, see generally 
MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND 
PECORA'S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN 
FINANCE (2011). 
30 Milton Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340 
(1966). 
31 HAZEN, supra note 10, at 74-75. 
32 Id. 
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Before a company lists on a public stock exchange, it must survive a 
burdensome and revealing process of disclosing financial information. 
The initial public offering process begins when the company hires an 
investment bank to underwrite the offering. The managing underwriter 
works with the issuer to navigate the due diligence process, determine the 
offering price, and recruit additional underwriters to sell the shares to the 
investing public.33 The underwriter performs a due diligence function, 
too.34 Once the underwriting process begins, the company works with its 
bank and legal team to navigate the necessary disclosures.  
The IPO process is designed to give the public investors enough 
information to make an informed decision on whether to purchase the 
offered shares and to understand the risks associated with that decision. 
The mandatory disclosure system requires the issuer to file a registration 
statement.35 The statement must include a prospectus for potential 
investors with material information about the company.36 A prospectus 
responds to the required registration form items while delivering a 
compelling narrative of the company. This reflects the competing demands 
of a Registration Statement: to satisfy regulators and the skeptical investor 
while ginning up interest in the offering. The issuer must describe the 
company’s business and the securities being registered, explain how it will 
use the proceeds generated from the sale, disclose pending legal 
proceedings, detail any material transactions with insiders, and identify 
principal investors, as well as directors and officers and their 
compensation.37 Perhaps most important for investors—and most 
worrying for issuers—are the required disclosures related to the 
company’s financial health. The company must file a standard Form S-I 
Registration Statement including financial statements, certain other 
financial data, analysis of the company's financial condition, and 
disclosures related to market risk.38 Furthermore, going public exposes the 
issuer, its officers, and board of directors to potential civil and criminal 
 
33 Katrina Ellis, Roni Michaely, and Maureen O'Hara, A Guide to the Initial 
Public Offering Process, 1999 WL 35299857, 1. 
34 Id.  
35 Rigers Gjyshi, The Integrated Disclosure System, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 47, 49 (2014). 
36 Id.; see also Form S-1 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 
1933, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 
37 Carl W. Schneider, Joseph M. Manko, & Robert S. Kant, Going Public: 
Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1981). 
38 See Form S-1 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-
1.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 
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liability for misrepresentations and omissions related to the issued 
securities.39   
In 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 ("SOX") as a response to a wave of corporate accounting scandals.40 
Whereas the pre-SOX regulatory regime largely left corporate governance 
to the states and the companies, SOX brought corporate governance under 
the federal securities regulation umbrella.41 SOX sought to improve 
corporate governance by imposing a number of disclosure requirements, 
setting criminal penalties for violations of securities laws, increasing 
oversight on accounting and auditing, and ratcheting up accountability of 
key corporate actors. For example, one SOX provision requires the public 
company’s CEO and CFO to each certify the accuracy of financial 
statements submitted to the SEC.42 This certification provides federal 
regulators and prosecutors with a basis for enforcing securities regulations 
when executives sign off on statements that fail to disclose fraud or include 
material misrepresentations.43 With the increased requirements under 
SOX, public companies must make extensive, regular disclosures and 
stand by those statements under threat of criminal penalty.  
Section 404 requires public companies to submit an annual report 
detailing the procedures and adequacy of internal controls and financial 
reporting processes.44 Section 404 also requires the company's outside 
auditor to assess the effectiveness of those controls. Section 906 of the law 
requires chief executive officers and chief financial officers to certify in 
writing that the report “fully complies” with the applicable provisions in 
the Exchange Act and, most importantly, that the report “fairly presents, 
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of 
 
39 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving A New Path to Equity Capital and 
Share Liquidity, 50 B.C.L. REV. 639, 643-47 (2009) (discussing myriad 
provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act under which companies, 
executives, and directors may be civilly or criminally liable). 
40 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1544 (2005) (criticizing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the circumstances surrounding its drafting and 
passage).   
41 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 1:22 
(2002). 
42 Byron F. Egan, Major Themes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, TEX. J. BUS. L., 
339, 376 (2008). 
43 Id. at 380 (discussing enforcement actions based on false certifications). 
44 Id. 
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the issuer.”45 Executives who willfully certify a non-compliant report face 
fines of up to $5 million and up to twenty years in prison.46   
Before SOX, the process of going public came at a significant cost to 
the company, in fees to advisors and staff hours spent preparing documents 
and navigating the process. Once the company lists on a public exchange, 
the costs continue with regular disclosure and reporting requirements and 
responding to public investors and analysts.47 Today, complying with 
reporting requirements are even greater under SOX.48 The risks are also 
significantly greater for companies and corporate executives: a 
misstatement could expose corporate executives to criminal prosecution. 
Faced with this daunting process and heightened compliance risks, large 
private companies increasingly seek to put off the IPO as long as possible, 
if the company ever registers at all.49 
B. The Decline in IPOs and the Rise of Unicorns 
 
For many of today’s biggest and most promising companies, the 
public markets offer few rewards that cannot also be obtained through 
private fundraising. There are many theories for why companies are 
increasingly eschewing the public stock market in favor of staying private. 
Whatever the reason(s), since 2000, the number of companies going public 
in the U.S. has declined.50  
 
45 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). 
46 Id.; see Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs 
Gone? The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 88 (2016). 
47 Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 17, at 720-21 (discussing the high costs 
associated with the average company’s initial public offering, particularly in the 
twenty-first century). 
48 See generally William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-
Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private", 55 EMORY L.J. 141 (2006). 
49 See id. at 718–19 (“Diminishing public companies have been exacerbated by 
the growing trend for companies to delay their public offering. For example, the 
average age of U.S. technology companies that went public in 1999 was four 
years. In 2014, it was eleven years.”). 
50 See Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs 
Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1690 (2013) (“During 
1980-2000, an average of 310 IPOs occurred each year in the United States, but 
this has fallen to an average of only 99 IPOs per year during 2001-2012. Even 
more dramatically, an average of 165 small-company (pre-inflation-adjusted 
annual sales of less than $50 million) IPOs occurred each and this number has 
dropped by more than 80% to an average of only 28 per year during 2001-
2012.”); see also de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 454-58 (summarizing the 
decline in exchange listings). 
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In trying to explain the decline in IPOs, some have also pointed 
specifically to Sarbanes-Oxley as the culprit, arguing that the 2002 law 
puts too much of an organizational and financial strain on public 
companies. 51 There is evidence that SOX dampened interest in going 
public and imposed real costs on public companies. But legislative 
changes alleviated some of the burdens Sarbanes-Oxley placed on 
companies.52  
Other theories explaining the drop in IPOs include: economies of 
scope and economies of scale driving corporate acquisitions of smaller 
companies,53 declining analyst coverage of public companies, market 
conditions, the perception that public companies are more likely to be 
sued, the decimalization of stock prices, and changes by the SEC to rules 
regulating brokerage activity.54 Whatever the cause of declining in IPOs, 
one thing is certain: companies are staying private longer and raising more 
capital through the private markets.55 
The uncomfortable consequence of this shift is that more and more 
investor capital is flowing to private companies that are not subject to the 
same disclosure requirements as public companies. Companies can 
operate in “stealth mode,” raising millions of dollars from investors 
without sharing the type of information that the Securities Act requires.56 
Many scholars have called attention to the growth of the private 
investment market and suggested possible reforms to address this sea 
change.57 But rather than regulate this fast-growing market, as discussed 
 
51 Rose, supra note 47, at 88.  
52 Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 51, at 1665 (“Following concerns that the 
implementation of [Sarbanes-Oxley], especially Section 404, was imposing 
excessive costs on small public companies, in June 2007 the SEC revised some 
of the rules, lessening the burdens on small companies.”). 
53 Id. at 1690 (theorizing that the decline in IPOs is primarily due to increased 
“importance of bringing products to market quickly” and because “greater value 
is created in a sale to a strategic buyer in the same or a related industry.”). 
54 See Rose, supra note 37, at 90-95. 
55 See, generally, de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 445. 
56 See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 17, at 696 (“[B]ecause the capital 
structure of private placements is, by definition, private, such firms are able to 
avoid complying with the disclosure regime under which public companies 
operate”). 
57 Adi Osovsky, The Curious Case of the Secondary Market with Respect to 
Investor Protection, 82 TENN. L. REV. 83 (2014); Bret Leone-Quick, Who's That 
Peeking in My Window: SEC Scrutiny of Private Companies, 26 SEC. LITIG. 27 
(2016); Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 174-77 (2017) (discussing the impact of regulations in creating unicorns 
and the Secondary Market); Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and 
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in the following section, regulators and Congress have focused on 
loosening existing regulations and expanding exemptions. 
C. Legislation Continues to Expand Exemptions 
 
Of the many factors that contributed to the growth in the market for 
pre-IPO investments, legislation is probably the most impactful. For most 
of the twentieth century, companies had a significant incentive to go 
public: early investors, founders, and employees wanted to cash in on their 
shares of the company. The SEC restricted when and under what 
conditions start-up company shareholders could transfer their stock.58  
The registration requirement was not without exceptions. Most 
significantly, the Securities Act allows companies to sell its unregistered 
securities to “accredited investors” under Rule 506 of Regulation D.59 The 
Securities Act defines accredited investors as including: certain financial 
institutions, such as banks, savings and loan associations, registered broker 
dealers, insurance companies, retirement plans, and insurance companies; 
qualifying business development companies and partnerships; the issuer's 
corporate executives and directors; trusts with total assets of more than $5 
million; and individuals who meet specific net worth and income 
requirements.60 Regulation D carved out a number of exemptions from 
registration for qualifying issues and issuers.61  
Over time, the SEC continued to relax restrictions on private 
placements, adopting Rule 144, which allows investors to sell stock after 
two years with certain conditions attached. Or, an investor could wait three 
years and sell the stock without any restrictions.62 The SEC decided that 
even that rule was too burdensome and whittled down the rule until it was 
little more than a minor inconvenience for investors, who may now sell 
stock under Rule 144 without any restrictions after just one year. This 
regulatory rollback made it possible for companies like Facebook, Google, 
 
Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1011-24 (2015) (discussing Rule 
144A trading platforms and the factors that contributed to the growth of the 
Secondary Market). 
58 See Jones, supra note 58, at 174. 
59 17 C.F.R. § § 230.501-230.508 (2018). 
60 Generally, an individual qualifies as an accredited investor if she has a 
personal net worth (or a joint net worth with her spouse) of more than $1 million 
or earned an individual income of more than $200,000 (or $300,000, if 
combined with a spouse) in the past two years and expects to earn the same in 
the current year. 17 C.F.R. §230.501(5)-(6) (2018). 
61 17 C.F.R. § § 230.501-230.508 (2018). 
62 See Jones, supra note 43, at 174. 
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and the unicorns of today to satisfy the liquidity demands of their 
employees and shareholders, greatly reducing the need for a public 
offering.  
Yet some unicorns still outgrew even these broadened exemptions; in 
2012, Facebook went public to avoid surpassing the maximum record 
shareholder limit.63 Partly to aid future unicorns following in Facebook’s 
footsteps, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“the 
JOBS Act”).64 The 2012 law “widen[ed] the space within which 
companies could stay outside the Act's regulatory reach and creat[ed] a 
new category of emerging growth companies that can avoid a number of 
the Act's regulatory requirements during the first years after an IPO”—
and, of course, quadrupled the number of record shareholders allowed so 
that future companies would, unlike Facebook, not necessarily have to go 
public.65  
 
D. The Investing Public Meets Private Offerings  
 
Regulatory rollback and the steady expansion of exemptions have 
helped make it possible for companies to raise mountains of cash through 
private offerings. As the private market grows, retail investors are 
increasingly investing (however indirectly) in these private startups, 
belying the myth that startups are the exclusive reserve for sophisticated, 
mostly institutional investors.66 In fact, a recent study suggests that the 
majority of the buyers and sellers in these transactions are individuals.67  
One reason for this development is that technology has made buying 
and selling shares of private companies easier than ever before. Online 
 
63 Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 338 
(2013). 
64 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, PL 112-106, April 5, 2012, 126 Stat 306 
(April 5, 2012). 
65 Id. at 342; see de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 460. 
66 See Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case Study of 
Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in unicorns (and Other Startups) and the 
Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C.L. REV. 1341, 1349. 
67 David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, and Edward Watts, Cashing it in: Private-
Company Exchanges and Employee Stock Sales Prior to IPO, STANFORD 
CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Sep. 12, 2018), (“Individuals make up the largest portion 
of both the buyer and seller populations in our sample. Individuals comprise 87 
percent of the known-seller population, based on total transaction dollar 
amounts; institutions only 13 percent . . . . Seventy-four percent of known 
buyers are individuals, based on transaction dollar amounts . . . .”). 
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exchanges like Second Market (now NASDAQ Private Market) and 
SharesPost offer investors real-time data, valuation information, and a 
platform through which investors can buy shares from company insiders. 
From 2013 through December 17, 2019, NASDAQ Private Market 
“facilitated secondary liquidity for over 33,000 shareholders, returning 
over $23 [billion] of value back to founders, employees and institutional 
investors.”68 That amount does not include the shares sold on other 
exchanges or outside any exchange through private transactions.  
Remarkably, any individual with a few thousand dollars can invest in 
private startups using an investment fund. In 2014, for example, 
SharesPost launched its SharesPost 100 Fund that provides unaccredited 
individuals with a way to invest in pre-IPO companies. For just $2500, an 
individual can purchase Class A Shares of the SharesPost 100 Fund, a 
continuously offered closed-end fund that “seeks capital appreciation by 
focusing on investments in late-stage, venture-backed private 
companies.”69   
Individuals also invest indirectly in startups through common 
investment vehicles like mutual funds and retirement funds, which have 
increasingly invested in private companies.70 But it is unclear whether 
mutual fund investors appreciate the significant risks associated with 
startup investments—or whether they are even aware that the fund invests 
in emerging companies.71 Some mutual funds have already had to make 
significant write downs on their startup investments.72 This is troubling 
 
68 MARKETINSIGHT, “Q&A with Nasdaq Private Market on Secondary Sales of 
Private Company Stock, NASDAQ,” (Dec. 18, 2019 3:31 PM), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/qa-with-nasdaq-private-market-on-secondary-
sales-of-private-company-stock-2019-12-17  
69 SharesPost, Investment Strategy, (Dec. 18, 2019, 4:46 PM), 
https://sharespost.com/marketplace/individual-investors/buying-private-
assets/sharespost-100-fund/strategy-and-investor-information/. 
70 Schwartz, supra note 67, at 1349 (“It is only recently that mutual funds have 
shown interest in putting their enormous resources behind emerging firms. 
Funds from the largest families, including Vanguard, Fidelity, and Blackrock, 
have lately begun steering investor assets toward unicorns. Allocations have 
risen sharply over the last few years and now total over $ 10 billion spread 
across over 250 funds, with Fidelity's funds leading the way. And while nascent 
statistics focus on unicorn investments, other startups might be on fund ledgers 
as well.”). 
71 Id. at 1354–55 (discussing the problem of mutual funds failing to inform 
unsuspecting investors that the fund invests in startups). 
72 Heather Somerville and Tim McLaughlin, Fidelity marks down stake in pre-
IPO startups Cloudera, Dropbox, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2016),  
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because some of the largest mutual fund companies, like T. Rowe Price, 
Fidelity, and Blackrock, are pooling these startup investments into popular 
mutual funds that make up many Americans’ 401(k)’s and individual 
retirement accounts.73  
But the SEC, far from concerned, believes retail investors should have 
more access to private offerings. In a speech to the Economic Club of New 
York, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton told the audience that the SEC was 
exploring “whether appropriately structured funds can facilitate Main 
Street investor access to private investments . . . .”74 In Chairman Clayton’s 
view, the SEC “should . . . increase the type and quality of opportunities 
for our Main Street investors in our private markets.”75 
The incredible collapse of Theranos shows how loosely regulated 
private companies pose a serious threat to investors and the public 
generally. As press reports and investor lawsuits have shown, Theranos’ 
harm extended to myriad diverse stakeholders including: patients that used 
Theranos’ blood tests; institutional investors, such as hedge funds, a 
mutual fund company, and a sovereign wealth fund; Theranos’ employees; 
and corporate partners, such as Walgreens and Safeway, and those 
companies’ shareholders. The widespread harm suggests that the SEC 
should more tightly regulate private companies and reconsider its efforts 
to encourage retail investment in private offerings.76  
III. THERANOS’ ASCENT AND THE PUBLIC HARM 
A. A Silicon Valley Star is Born 
In 2004, Elizabeth Holmes dropped out of Stanford University’s 
School of Engineering to start a company she believed would 
revolutionize blood testing. Holmes, who lacked significant medical or 
scientific experience, wanted to perform a battery of more than 200 tests 




73 David Gelles and Conor Dougherty, Americans’ Retirement Funds 
Increasingly Contain Tech Start-Up Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/business/dealbook/tech-money-sends-
funds-on-the-hunt-for-unicorns.html. 
74 Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York 
(Sept. 9, 2019). 
75 Id.  
76 See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private 
Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 584 (2016) 
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blood testing equipment used. She ignored warnings from experts like 
Stanford medical professor Phyllis Gardner, who advised the young 
entrepreneur that her blood testing idea was not medically possible, and 
her own engineers who laid out the technical obstacles.77 Undeterred, 
Holmes developed a blood testing device, Edison, that she claimed 
performed more than 240 faster than competing devices and with less 
blood.78  But, in 2014, several years after Theranos launch, Edison only 
performed 15 tests and even those few tests were often inaccurate.79 Under 
pressure to deliver the “breakthrough technology” that she had promised, 
Holmes tried to mask its failures by having Theranos perform tests on its 
competitors’ traditional machines and hiding inaccurate test results.80  
In many ways, Theranos epitomized the typical Silicon Valley start-
up. Nowhere is that more clear than with Holmes, a brash young founder 
of the Steve Jobs-archetype, hocking a (largely unproven) vision for 
revolutionizing not just an entire industry, but the whole world. As the 
company’s public profile grew, however, Holmes’ lofty idea of offering 
faster, less intrusive, and more comprehensive blood testing failed to 
materialize. The company faced myriad problems, including infighting 
among managers, a hostile workplace, product delays, regulatory issues, 
and seemingly insurmountable technological challenges.81 As a private 
company, Theranos managed to keep much of its troubles from the public, 
even as Theranos began offering its unreliable blood-testing to 
unsuspecting customers.   
B. Private Investors Pour Money into the Company 
Theranos’ struggles to deliver on its lofty promises did not dampen 
investors’ excitement about the company’s technology.82 Starting around 
2010, when Theranos filed a notice that it sold $45 million shares,83 the 
 
77 JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY 
STARTUP 218-19 (2018). 
78 John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled With Its Blood-Test 
Technology, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16. 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-blood-tests-
1444881901. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 See Luke Timmerman, Theranos Raises $45M for Personalized Medicine, 
XCONOMY (July 8, 2010), https://xconomy.com/san-
francisco/2010/07/08/theranos-raises-45m-for-personalized-medicine/. 
83 Form Regulation D filed by Theranos, Inc., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, (July 8, 2010) available at 
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fledgling company shaped a myth about its product and the technological 
advances it represented. In the ensuing years, Theranos managed to fool 
investors, customers, its board, regulators, and much of the press, taking 
the usual Silicon Valley attitude of “fake it till you make it”84 to 
unprecedented heights of deception.  
Theranos did not inform its investors about the company’s poor 
financial health and early investors continued to pour more money into the 
company at ever-higher valuations. Critically, as a private company, 
Theranos did not need to make regular disclosures to the SEC, and the 
company’s financials were not subject to the type of scrutiny public 
companies endure. The company provided investors with some evidence 
of the company’s success by way of marketing materials, investor 
presentations, product demos, and meetings with executives; the company 
also disclosed some information through its Form D filings. But, for the 
most part, as a private company Theranos was not required to share much 
information with investors, even as the company took in hundreds of 
millions of dollars.85 When Theranos did share information with investors, 
Holmes and the company’s president and COO, Sunny Balwani, created 
financial projections that were extremely optimistic and had no basis in 
reality.86  
Notably, Theranos achieved its remarkable $9 billion valuation 
through a fundraising round in which the company offered investors 
financial projections that were “five- to twelvefold” higher than its internal 
projections.87 Most public companies of Theranos’ size have a chief 
financial officer (CFO), or similar executive, who oversees the company’s 
finances and can provide investors with a picture of the company’s 




84 Erin Griffith, Theranos and Silicon Valley’s ‘Fake It Till You Make It’ 
Culture, WIRED.COM (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/theranos-
and-silicon-valleys-fake-it-till-you-make-it-culture/. 
85 Theranos was uniquely credible in its argument that it could provide only 
limited information to investors and the inquiring public. Theranos jealously 
guarded its proprietary technology, which seemed reasonable given that the 
company was seeking to revolutionize a highly competitive biotechnology 
industry.  
86 On February 4, 2014, a hedge fund purchased $96 million worth of Theranos 
stock at $17 a share, setting the company’s valuation at $9 billion. Balwani 
induced the hedge fund executives to buy the stock by sending a spreadsheet 
with financial projections that were multiples of Theranos’ own internal 
projections. See, CARREYROU, supra note 78, at 182 (2018). 
87 Id. at 182-83. 
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replacement. Danise Yam, a “corporate controller” at Theranos, was the 
closest approximation to the critical CFO role, but she had little 
responsibility for the company’s finances and her financial projections 
were overly inflated. Balwani surpassed even those rosy projections, 
creating revenue and profit projections “from whole cloth.”88 Balwani 
persuaded a hedge fund, Partner Fund Management, to invest $96 million 
by fabricating financial data and grossly misrepresenting the capabilities 
of Theranos’ blood testing technology.89 Partner Fund’s investment valued 
the company at $9 billion.90 
This deception probably would not have been possible if Theranos was 
a public company. If Theranos filed for an initial public offering, the 
company would engage an investment bank that would, in turn, conduct 
an extensive due diligence process. The bank would pour over financial 
data and scrutinize Balwani's fabricated numbers. Legal counsel and 
auditing firms would similarly examine the company's books and make 
sure that Theranos provided investors with a realistic picture of the 
company's financial health and risks.  
Theranos' registration statement would include a prospectus that 
provides potential investors with all material information about the 
company. Theranos would need to disclose pending legal proceedings, of 
which there were many given Theranos' proclivity for legal action against 
reporters, rivals, and its own employees. The registration statement would 
include an S-1 filing, complete with the company's financial data and 
disclosures of material risk. It is unlikely that auditors and banks would 
accept Yam and Balwani's inflated figures. Further, it is unclear whether 
those executives would have made those misrepresentations if they had to 
certify the accuracy of the financial statements under threat of criminal 
prosecution, like public company executives must do under SOX. 
C. Others Fail to Recognize Theranos’ Fraud  
The technology industry, the press, and regulators also largely 
accepted Holmes’ story at face value. Theranos’ largely compliant 
board—made up of highly accomplished business, military, and 
government leaders—rarely questioned Holmes.91 Government regulators, 
for the most part, failed to uncover the extensive compliance problems in 
Theranos’ laboratories—despite numerous inspections of the facilities. 
 
88 CARREYROU, supra note 78, at 182. 
89 Id. at 179-183. 
90 Id. at 183. 
 
91 For a close examination of corporate governance and board failures at 
unicorns, See Jones, supra note 58, at 165. 
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Although some reporters raised questions about the company,92 several 
media outlets published fawning coverage regurgitating Holmes’ claims 
about what the company had accomplished.93 Starting in 2015, reporters 
started seriously investigating the company’s technology and whether the 
supposedly revolutionary blood tests could deliver on the myriad promises 
made by CEO Elizabeth Holmes.94  
While many of Holmes’ claims regarding the technology can be 
chalked up to the boundless (and often baseless) optimism that infects 
many of Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurs, Holmes blatantly deceived her 
audience at critical moments in the company’s rise. For example, when a 
blood-testing machine malfunctioned during a demonstration for 
European drug maker Novartis, Holmes simply faked the test. Holmes and 
her team completed a live, unsuccessful test in Europe but Theranos’ team 
in California sent a fabricated result to Novartis as evidence of the 
technology’s capability.95  
Holmes also employed deception to dupe investors and business 
partners. While the company claimed its blood analyzers were capable of 
running more than 200 tests using just few drops of blood, in fact, the 
readers often malfunctioned and Theranos routinely ran tests using 
traditional machines made by competitors like Siemens.96 Balwani then 
inflated the company’s financial projections to convince investors to give 
more money at higher valuations.97 And so it went for years. The 
company’s executives would use ineffective technology on patients, 
misrepresent its capabilities to win over business partners, and use those 
business deals (or sometimes wholly invented deals) to lure unsuspecting 
investors.  
 
92 See generally CARREYROU, supra note 78 (Wall Street Journal reporter John 
Carreyrou’s account of efforts to investigate Theranos).   
93 It is instructive that Theranos generated little press interest until it was 
required to disclose a fundraising transaction in 2010. On July 8th, 2010, an 
online publication, Xconomy, published a short article about Theranos' $45 
million raise. There appears to be scant coverage of the startup until this point. 
See Luke Timmerman, Theranos Raises $45M for Personalized Medicine, 
XCONOMY (July 8, 2010), https://xconomy.com/san-
francisco/2010/07/08/theranos-raises-45m-for-personalized-medicine/. 
94 Carreyrou, supra note 78. 
95 CARREYROU, supra note 78, at 3-7. 
96 Id. at 169. 
97 On February 4, 2014, a hedge fund purchased $96 million worth of Theranos 
stock at $17 a share, setting the company’s valuation at $9 billion. Balwani 
induced the hedge fund executives to buy the stock by sending a spreadsheet 
with financial projections that were multiples of Theranos’ own internal 
projections. See, CARREYROU, supra note 78, at 182. 
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The company continued to perpetrate its fraud until 2018 when the 
SEC formally charged Holmes and Balwani with securities fraud.98 The 
company and its executives are now engulfed in lawsuits by regulators, 
the Department of Justice, investors, blood-testing patients, business 
partners, and even documentary filmmakers.99 In 2018, Theranos 
announced it would dissolve.100  
D. Theranos’ Victims 
 
Before examining the regulatory solutions that may have prevented 
Theranos’ fraud, it is important to first consider the harm Theranos caused 
to corporate partners, the public, and investors.  
1. More Than Just a Few Sophisticated Investors  
 
A class action lawsuit filed in California reveals the unspoken truth in 
private company fundraising: there are more investors than just those 
listed on the capitalization table.101 In Colman v. Theranos, the investors 
who sued Theranos for fraud, misrepresentation, and market manipulation 
were not direct investors in the company.102 The class members were so-
called “indirect investors,” or “investors who purchased interests in 
entities that bought Theranos stock.”103   
Although the district court ultimately denied the plaintiff's motion for 
class certification, the ruling and the documents offered in support of the 
action reveal the extensive trading in Theranos shares by direct investors 
and indirect investors. The named plaintiff Robert Colman provides an 
example of these transactions occurring in the private securities market. 
“[F]rom January 2013 to October 2016, Theranos sold Series C–1 and C–
 
98 Press Release, Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President Balwani 
Charged With Massive Fraud, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 
14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-41. 
99 See Partner Invs., L.P. v. Theranos, Inc., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 129, *1; In re 
Ariz. Theranos, Inc., Litig., 256 F. Supp. 3d 1009; Walgreen v. Theranos, Inc., 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117428; Colman v. Theranos, Inc., 325 F.R.D. 
629; 2018 SEC LEXIS 752, *1. 
100 Letter from David Taylor, CEO and General Counsel, Theranos, to Theranos 
stockholders (Sept. 4, 2018); see also, Daniel Kass, The Bloody Saga That Made 
Theranos Finally Call It Quits, LAW360. 
101 Colman v. Theranos, 325 F.R.D. 629 (2018). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 634. 
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2 Preferred Stock to over 30 individuals and investment entities.”104 Lucas 
Venture Group XI, LLC was among that group, purchasing nearly half a 
million Series C-1 shares for a little more than $7 million.105 The Lucas 
fund was able to purchase these shares because it had its own investors 
like Colman, who purchased interests in the fund.106 Colman, for example, 
spent $500,000 to buy interests in the Lucas fund with the “express 
purpose of making corresponding purchases of Theranos securities.”107 
Colman was not alone; plaintiffs produced a list of more than 200 
individuals who indirectly invested in at least twelve investment funds 
with the purpose of financing purchases of Theranos shares.108 These 
individuals’ investments ranged in size from $15,000 to more than $17 
million.109 
This lawsuit reveals private companies like Theranos are increasingly 
financed by a variety of different investor types, not just venture capital 
firms or institutional investors.110 As a result, the private-public securities 
regulation framework appears outdated in the face of such a complicated 
and expansive private fundraising universe, where hundreds of individuals 
can indirectly invest in an unregulated private company through 
investment funds and even trade those shares on a liquid secondary 
exchange. 
 
2. Corporate Partners Invest Millions 
 
The Theranos fraud harmed more than its investors; Theranos formed 
numerous partnerships with corporations—most notably Walgreens Boots 
Alliance and Safeway Inc.—whose businesses suffered when the 
partnerships failed to produce the expected gains. Like Theranos’ 
investors and customers, these business partners fell for the company’s 
lofty promises of revolutionary technology and seemingly infinite 
potential. When Theranos failed to deliver, however, these companies (and 
their shareholders) suffered and in the case of Walgreens, customers’ 
health were put at risk. 
Safeway, the grocery chain, spent at least four years and an incredible 
$350 million building clinics so that it could offer Theranos' blood tests to 
 
104 Id. at 635. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 637. 
108 Id. at 639; see Kathrein Decl. Exs. CC–HH (ECF 177–7) 
109 Colman, 325 F.R.D. at 640. 
110 See generally Schwartz, supra note 33. 
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customers inside its grocery stores.111 Similarly, Walgreens formed a 2010 
partnership with Theranos that eventually led to the drugstore chain 
offering Theranos blood testing in as many as forty stores. In a subsequent 
lawsuit, Walgreens sued Theranos for $140 million, which represented its 
investment in the Theranos partnership. That figure also reportedly 
included a convertible-debt note and investment in the company.112  
Walgreens and Safeway staked their respective brands on the 
promising technology Theranos pitched. Safeway even completed a 
massive redesign of its stores to feature Theranos.113 But the blood tests 
proved unreliable, customers complained of surprising test results, and 
doctors began expressing their concerns about the accuracy of Theranos’ 
testing. Ultimately, both partnerships failed, costing Walgreens and 
Safeway millions of dollars and potentially causing physical harm to 
Walgreens’ customers.  
 
3. Patients and the Unsuspecting Public 
 
Importantly, Theranos’ partnership with Walgreens extended beyond 
a financial investment. Like many Silicon Valley companies, the 
technology was a work in progress and the company’s executives 
exaggerated the products’ potential. But, unlike other Silicon Valley 
companies, Theranos operated in the highly regulated biotechnology 
industry and tested its faulty products on unsuspecting patients. Theranos 
offered its blood tests to patients in multiple states, particularly Arizona—
the primary test market for the Walgreens-Theranos joint venture—and 
even in Mexico. According to the Walgreens suit, in 2012, Theranos and 
Walgreens formed a joint venture and Walgreens invested $140 million 
into the startup.114 Under the partnership, Walgreens would offer 
Theranos' blood tests at “Wellness Center” clinics in Arizona and 
California.115 The plaintiffs in Walgreens suggest that Theranos, through 
 
111 John Carreyrou, Safeway, Theranos Split After $350 Million Deal Fizzles, 
WALL ST. J.  (Nov. 10, 2015) https://www.wsj.com/articles/safeway-theranos-
split-after-350-million-deal-fizzles-1447205796. 
112 Lauren Thomas, Theranos, Walgreens Reportedly Reach a Deal to Settle Suit 
for Under $30 Million, CNBC.COM (Jun. 21, 2017). 
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its partnership with Walgreens, tested thousands of patients, who were 
essentially subjected to “beta testing” of an incomplete and unreliable 
blood testing device.116 Indeed, Theranos was not adhering to industry 
standards and its tests often produced results that were inconsistent with 
traditional (and more reliable) blood testing.117 Many patients received 
alarming results from faulty Theranos blood tests.118  
It is tempting to consider Theranos as an outlier among startups 
because most unicorns operate in industries that seem to pose a lower risk 
of physical harm to the public, such as e-commerce and internet 
software.119 But the reality is that many of the more than 400 unicorns 
interact with the public in ways similar to Theranos and, in at least a few 
cases, with the potential for great public harm.120 23andMe is a 
biotechnology startup that offers direct-to-consumer genetic testing. Uber 
and Lyft employ millions of drivers, transport millions more riders, and 
both companies have experimented with self-driving cars. Airbnb arranges 
for homeowners across the world to rent their residences to strangers.121 
At its peak, WeWork employed 12,500 workers122 and managed a $50 
 
116 Id. at 1021. 
117 Journalist John Carreyrou recounts his experience personally testing 
Theranos’ device with a doctor against a traditional LabCorp blood test. The 
results were significantly different and, as with many Theranos patients, 
suggested alarming health problems from high blood pressure to Addison’s 
disease. See, CARREYROU, supra note 52, at 232-236. 
118 See Christopher Weaver, Agony, Alarm and Anger for People Hurt by 
Theranos’s Botched Blood Tests, WALL ST. J.  (Oct. 20, 2016 9:52 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-patients-hurt-by-theranos-1476973026 
(describing how patients received erroneous test results and adjusted critical 
medication as a result). 
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INSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/unicorn-startup-market-map/.  
120 CB INSIGHTS: THE GLOBAL UNICORN CLUB (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies.  
121 The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic provided a stark example of the scope of 
Airbnb’s business and the risks to investors and the public.  See, e.g., Tripp 
Mickle and Preetika Rana, 'A Bargain With the Devil' - Bill Comes Due for 
Overextended Airbnb Hosts, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2020 10:15 AM), 
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122 Samantha Sharf, WeWork Unraveling Continues With New Layoff Round, 
FORBES (Apr. 30, 2020 7:02 PM), 
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billion portfolio of office leases.123  Its largest investor, SoftBank, has 
invested more than $12 billion into the company, providing an object 
lesson in the risks of investing in young high-risk companies.124  These are 
just a few of the more than 400 unicorns and many more private companies 
with sub-$1 billion valuations offer the public services with little oversight 
or disclosures. 
IV. THE NEED TO REGULATE PRIVATE COMPANIES 
A. An Anomaly or a Sign of What is to Come? 
 
Theranos is, in some ways, an anomaly. A number of factors 
exacerbated the fraud: a compelling narrative largely accepted by the 
media; an extraordinary board of directors who inspired investor and 
public confidence in the company but lacked the skepticism or relevant 
experience to fulfill its oversight duties; seemingly insatiable investor 
appetite for high-growth technology companies; a charismatic leader who 
enjoyed little resistance from inside or outside the company; a lax medical 
regulatory regime that was repeatedly fooled by Theranos’ smoke and 
mirrors; and a total lack of scrutiny by securities regulators. While some 
of these factors may emerge again in another private company, it seems 
unlikely that a similar set of circumstances will occur with such regularity 
as to require a broad reform to the private capital markets.  
But several important factors support changing the current regulatory 
regime: (1) the private investment market continues to grow; (2) private 
companies have, in turn, grown in size, scope, and valuation; (3) there is 
ample evidence that even sophisticated and/or institutional investors are 
vulnerable to fraud; (4) as Theranos showed, unpoliced private companies 
pose serious risks to the broader investing public—not just accredited 
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misery, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2020 6:09 AM), 
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investors and institutions; (5) reforms to protect investors are feasible and 
not unduly burdensome on companies. 
B. Possible Regulatory Reforms 
1. Require Unicorns to Disclose Certain Financial Information  
 
Theranos was able to pull off an elaborate fraud with remarkable ease. 
As a private company, Theranos needed only to persuade enough wealthy 
investors to take the company at its word. Unlike public companies, 
Theranos’ did not certify its financial projections; unrestrained, its 
executives grossly inflated the company’s numbers. Drawn in by lofty 
numbers and unsubstantiated promises, investors poured millions of 
dollars into Theranos, valuing the company at $9 billion. Troublingly, 
Theranos raised the funds without making any substantial financial 
disclosures to the SEC. 
Theranos is not alone in this respect; unicorns routinely raise millions 
of dollars in funding rounds without offering investors the type of 
exhaustive disclosures that public companies must regularly submit to the 
public.125 Many companies justify this reluctance to share information 
with investors as protecting trade secrets, proprietary technology, or 
competitive advantages. But the truth is that companies have little 
financial incentive to share information unless a securities law mandates 
disclosure.126 This has led some to propose revising the securities law 
framework to require greater disclosure of at least some private 
companies.127  
One such proposal by University of Washington School of Law 
Professor Jennifer S. Fan would require unicorns to share their restated 
certificate of incorporation publicly and make the company's up-to-date 
financial information available to all stockholders and employees, rather 
than just major investors.128 Under this “hybrid disclosure” system, a 
unicorn would have to disclose this otherwise private information to key 
stakeholders within ninety days of closing a financing valuing the 
 
125 See Fan, supra note 77, at 587-88 (discussing the ubiquity of unicorns and 
the ease by which private companies secure millions of dollars in financing); de 
Fontenay, supra note 17, at 448 (“Today, private companies can raise ample, 
cheap capital with relative ease.”). 
 
126 See id. at 477-78 (discussing private companies’ reluctance to participate in 
the public markets mandatory disclosure system). 
127 See Fan, supra note 77, at 598-611; 
128 Id. at 609. 
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company at $1 billion or more (the unicorn threshold).129 Setting the 
threshold at $1 billion valuation may be somewhat arbitrary, but setting 
the threshold too low risks overburdening startups and smaller companies 
that could not afford to comply with even a modest disclosure system. 
Some larger private companies already provide audited financials to their 
investors, suggesting that established businesses are capable and even 
willing to participate in a system like this.130 
The hybrid disclosure system is incomplete unless there is a third-
party auditing requirement. Otherwise, Theranos—and other similarly 
inclined unicorns—could evade detection by exaggerating or 
misrepresenting its disclosed financials. Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley was 
passed partly as a reaction to the accounting scandals and securities fraud 
of the 1990s and early 2000s (namely, Enron and Worldcom), which 
showed that corporate executives were willing and able to exaggerate, 
manipulate, and blatantly lie to deceive investors.131 Similarly, Theranos 
executives consistently showed a willingness to lie to investors, the media, 
and the public about the company’s financial health and its technology. 
Any disclosure system aimed at preventing fraud and protecting investors 
must have a mechanism whereby a disinterested third party verifies the 
company’s financial statements and disclosures.  
A mandatory unicorn disclosure system like the one Professor Fan 
proposes would undoubtedly receive pushback from unicorns but 
improved financial transparency would benefit all investors in the long 
run132 and alleviate some of the problems unicorns face.133 
 




130 de Fontenay, supra note 17, at 480–81 (“Larger private companies often 
choose to be audited regularly and disclose their financial statements to at least 
some subset of their investors.”). 
131 Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the 
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
671, 671-72 (2002). 
 
132 Indeed, America’s regulatory system is premised on the notion that, 
generally, more transparency benefits the investor. 
133 Professor Fan notes that, without changes, some unicorns may die off, “as 
evidenced [in 2015] by mutual fund markdowns, fewer unicorn births, and a 
substantial decrease in mega-round financings.” Fan, supra note 77, at 640-641. 
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The hybrid disclosure system should also require executives to review 
and certify the financial information provided to investors, similar to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s certification requirement. Under SOX, corporate 
executives must review and certify the company’s annual and quarterly 
reports. Executives at private companies, however, operate without this 
liability and therefore feel little pressure to investigate or question the 
validity of financial statements and projections. At Theranos, for example, 
Holmes and Balwani misled investors with inflated revenue projections 
and fictitious sales agreements with pharmaceutical companies.134 
Balwani provided investors with wholly fabricated financial projections 
that had no basis in reality—and therefore could have easily been exposed 
by a third-party audit. Requiring executives at unicorns to review and 
certify financial projections rightly places the burden of verifying the 
numbers on the company.  
In the event that a company like Theranos defrauds investors, the 
certification requirement provides strong proof that the executive-
signatories were aware of the company’s financial health, making it easier 
to hold these executives liable for any misrepresentations.135 Thus, this 
certification requirement would expose executives to civil and even 
criminal liability if they knowingly certified figures they knew to be false. 
In the case of Theranos, for example, Balwani may not have chosen to 
reject the corporate controller’s lower figures if he knew that he, as well 
as other Theranos executives, would have to personally acknowledge that 
the figures contained no omissions or misrepresentations.  
On its own, a SOX-like certification requirement would not 
sufficiently address the problem, but it would be a powerful reminder to 
the corporate executive that she is exposing herself to civil and criminal 
liability if she knowingly misrepresents the company’s financial health. 
Further, the certification will aid law enforcement seeking to hold those 
executives accountable once the fraud is exposed. Finally, certification 
will give private litigants strong evidence against companies and 
executives.  
 
3. Disclosing Transactions in the Private Securities Market 
 
The SEC could impose mandatory disclosures for all private securities 
transactions. While this may seem radical, the SEC adopted a rule 
proposed by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in 2013 
 
134 See CARREYROU, supra note 52, at 7-8, 49-50, 182-83. 
135 See, BARTOS, supra note 6, at 158. 
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that required dissemination of certain Rule 144A transactions.136 The 
purpose of this rule was to improve price transparency in these 
transactions, which, in turn, would “enhance pre-trade price discovery, 
foster more competitive pricing, reduce costs to investors and assist market 
participants in determining the quality of their executions.”137 The SEC 
and FINRA also predicted that the dissemination would “improve the 
quality of the valuation of securities and derivative positions for publicly 
issued securities of the Securities Act Rule 144A issuer and for similar 
securities.”138 A similar rule change with respect to applicable Rule 144A 
equity transactions and Regulation D exempt transactions could 
dramatically increase transparency in the secondary market. Such a move 
would not only increase market efficiency, but it would have the added 
benefit of arming investors with up-to-date information on pre-IPO 
companies. 
V. Conclusion 
Financial regulatory reforms are rarely popular. History has shown, 
high-profile financial scandals often act as a catalyst for legislative 
interest, regulatory attention, and, occasionally, substantial regulatory 
reforms. The Great Depression and the notorious Wall Street “bucket 
shops” led to the Pecora hearings and the passage of the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act.139 The Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, a systemic 
banking crisis involving more than a thousand thrift banks, led to the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989.140 
The corporate finance scandals and bankruptcies of the early 2000s, most 
notably Enron Corporation and WorldCom, shined a light on corporate 
greed and galvanized legislative support for Sarbanes-Oxley.141 The Great 
Recession and the sub-prime-loan-fueled housing collapse ushered in 
substantial financial reforms (namely, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) of 2010). The financial 
wrongdoing also led to widespread protests and public hearings, such as 
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, where Senator 
Carl Levin memorably excoriated Goldman Sachs witnesses for profiting 
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during the financial crisis while the bank’s clients lost money.142 But still, 
regulatory reform is never easy; even the reforms passed after the 1929 
crash and the housing collapse of 2007 faced substantial pushback.143 
Theranos may prove to be a watershed moment for securities 
regulation, but, now more than three years after the company unraveled, 
there is little reason to expect the type of legislative response that followed 
the historical financial scandals. More likely, Theranos will be the canary 
in the coal mine, warning investors, regulators, and the public of the 
dangers of ever-growing unregulated private companies. The type of 
reforms discussed in this Note, such as requiring unicorns to disclose 
material information to regulators and the public, would represent 
important steps toward transparency and could prevent future frauds from 
ascending to the heights that Theranos reached. The seismic shift in the 
capital markets away from publicly listed companies and toward private 




142 See, e.g., Brian Montopoli, Levin Repeatedly References "Sh**ty Deal" at 
Goldman Hearing, CBS NEWS, Apr. 27, 2010, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/levin-repeatedly-references-shty-deal-at-
goldman-hearing. 
143 See George W. Madison, Financial Regulatory Reform: Key Changes That 
Reduced Systemic Risk, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., January 2015, at 
17, 18 (comparing criticism of the regulatory reforms in the 1930s with criticism 
of Dodd-Frank legislation).  
